Abstract-The paper considers a bidirectional power flow model of the electric vehicles (EVs) in a charging station. The EVs can inject energy by discharging via a vehicle-to-grid (V2G) service, which can enhance the profits of the charging station. However, frequent charging and discharging degrade battery life. We propose a menu-based pricing scheme, where the charging station selects a price for each arriving user (EV owner) for the amount of battery utilization, the total energy, and the time (deadline) that the EV will stay. The user can accept one of the menus or rejects all. The user reaches its decision based on the utilities. The charging utilizes its own limited renewable energy, and the conventional energy bought from the grid to serve the users. We show that there exists a prior-free pricing mechanism, which maximizes the ex-post social welfare for a myopic scenario. It selects a lower price for the menu containing a higher V2G service. However, the prior free pricing mechanism does not necessarily maximizes the expected profit. We show that the pricing strategy, which sets the price for a menu at a fixed value greater than the marginal cost of serving the menu, maximizes the expected profit for a wide class of utility functions. In the menu-based pricing, when the harvested renewable energy is small the users have higher incentives for the V2G service. We, numerically, show that the charging station's profit and the user's surplus both increase as V2G service is efficiently utilized by the pricing mechanism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation E LECTRIC VEHICLES (EVs) are increasingly becoming popular because of their efficiency and potential to reduce the carbon consumption. Realizing the above, regulators are providing incentives to the consumers to switch to electric vehicles. Manufacturers (e.g. Tesla, Nissan) are increasingly developing EVs equipped with superior technologies. The charging stations are being deployed. However, a wide deployment of EVs The authors are with the School of Industrial Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907 USA (e-mail:, ghosh39@purdue.edu; vaneet@ purdue.edu).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TVT. 2018.2865706 requires an extensive network of charging stations which can be capable of charging large number of vehicles. The charging stations have to be profitable, otherwise the dream of electrification of the transportation system will remain a distant dream. Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) service has been proposed [2] , [3] to enhance the profitability of the EVs. In the V2G service, EVs can inject energy to the grid by discharging from their batteries. Thus, this bidirectional power flow where EVs can both charge and discharge has a lot of potentials. Hence, a lot of effort is going on for developing bi-directional EVs [4] . The charging stations may earn extra revenue by selling extra energy or even using the energy of batteries of an EV to charge other EVs. However, a higher amount of charging and discharging cycles will degrade the battery life. Hence, the owners of the EVs have to be compensated adequately for the V2G service. Thus, though a charging station can gain an additional profit using the V2G service of the EVs, without a proper pricing mechanism, the owners of the EVs will not prefer the V2G service in the first place which may nullify the profit of the charging station.
The charging station needs to select a proper pricing mechanism for the EV charging and an incentive for the V2G service. Without such mechanism, the V2G service in the charging station will not be possible. However, finding a proper pricing mechanism is difficult because the charging station is in general unaware of the user's preferences, and their arrival times to the charging station.
B. Our Contributions
We propose a menu based pricing scheme for charging an EV. The menu based pricing is a posted price mechanism. Whenever an EV arrives at the charging station, the charging station offers a variety of contracts (l, t, BU ) to the EV's owner (or, user) at a price p B U l,t to the user where the user will be able to charge at least l units of energy within the deadline t for completion, and the battery usage (total charging and discharging, Definition 1) will be limited to l + BU amount. Thus, if a user accepts the contract (l, t, BU ), the total amount of V2G service (or, discharging amount) will be limited to BU/2 amount. If the discharging amount is d, then the total charging amount will be at least l + d before the deadline t.
The user either accepts one of the contracts by paying the specified price or rejects all of those based on its payoff. We assume that the user gets a utility for consuming l amount of energy within the deadline t. However, the user also has to incur a cost for the discharge. The payoff of the user (or, user's 0018-9545 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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surplus) for a contract is the difference between the utility and the sum of the cost incurred for the discharge, and the price to be paid for the contract. There are various advantages of the above pricing mechanism. First, the price is computed in an online fashion for each incoming user. Second, the charging station can optimize its own available resources, and the cost of buying conventional energy to serve different users, and select price accordingly. Third, the charging station also provides options of the maximum battery utilization to the users. The user who is not interested in the V2G service is entitled to do that by selecting the contract with BU as 0. Finally, the user's decision is much simplified. She only needs to select one of the contracts (or, reject all). We consider that the charging station is equipped with renewable energy harvesting devices and a storage device for storing energy. The charging station may also buy conventional energy from the market to fulfill the contract of the user if required. Hence, if a new user accepts the contract (l, t, BU ), a cost is incurred to the charging station. This cost may also depend on the existing EVs, and their agreed contracts. For example, if the charging station's renewable energy resource is utilized for existing EVs, it may have to buy from the grid to fulfill the incoming EV's contract. We show that obtaining the cost of fulfilling a contract is a linear programming problem. We also show that for a given charging amount within a given deadline, if a user accepts a contract with a higher battery utilization, the price of the contract is lower (Lemma 1). Hence, the V2G service decreases the price of a contract.
We consider two optimization problems-i) social welfare 1 maximization, and ii) the EV charging station's profit maximization. Note that even for a clairvoyant charging station, i.e., if the charging station knows the utilities, and the arrival times of the users, the charging station has to consider all the possible combinations of the contracts to find the optimal one. Hence, the strategy space increases exponentially with the number of users. Note that different users may have different utilities, and different preferences for battery utilization. Since the charging station is unaware of the users' utilities, thus, finding the optimal pricing mechanism is inherently challenging. Moreover, since the cost of serving a user's contract depends on the number of existing users, thus, the profit of the charging station also depends on the arrival times of the users, which evolves over time. Thus, finding the optimal pricing mechanism is inherently challenging. Thus, we consider a myopic pricing strategy (Section IV-B) where the charging station selects a price only considering the past users and the user which arrives. It does not consider the future users nor the utilities of the users. We, thus, investigate the myopically optimal pricing strategy. Finding an optimal pricing strategy even in a myopic scenario is not trivial. The problem is inherently non-convex. The acceptance of a contract inherently depends on the price selected for the other contracts. Since the price is continuous, the strategy space is uncountably infinite. We show that there exists a pricing mechanism which maximizes the ex-post social welfare, i.e., maximizes the social welfare for every possible realization of the utility function. The pricing scheme is simple to compute, as the charging station selects a price which is equal to the marginal cost for fulfilling a certain contract for a new user (Theorem 1). However, the above pricing scheme only provides zero profit to the charging stations. On the other hand, when a charging station is clairvoyant (i.e., the charging station knows the utilities of the users), there exists a pricing scheme which jointly maximizes the ex-post social welfare, and the profit of the charging station (Lemma 4). Though, in the above pricing mechanism, the charging station sets the price such that user's surplus becomes 0. Thus, a clairvoyant charging station may not be beneficial for the user's surplus. On the other hand, if the charging station is unaware of the user's utilities, the prior-free pricing mechanism, where the price is independent of the distribution of the utilities does not give any profit to the charging station.
We show that there may not exist a pricing strategy which simultaneously maximizes the ex-post social welfare and the expected profit if the charging station is not clairvoyant. We specify the maximum possible profit fetching pricing strategy while maximizing the ex-post social welfare (Theorem 3). In the pricing mechanism, the charging station scales the price by the lowest end-point of the support of the distribution of the utilities. Thus, the charging station needs to know the lowest possible acceptance price (or, the lowest end-point of the support of the distribution of the utilities). Above pricing strategy provides a worst case maximum profit to the charging station. However, the above pricing strategy is not a prior-free, rather the charging station needs to know the lowest possible acceptance price for a contract. Though we obtain the results only for the myopic scenario, we show that the above pricing strategy is also optimal in the non-myopic scenario when the user's utilities are i.i.d. (Theorem 6) .
We, subsequently, investigates the expected profit maximizing pricing strategy for the charging station. Towards this end, we propose a pricing strategy which yields a fixed (say β) amount of profit to the charging station. We show that a suitable choice of β can maximize the profit of the myopic charging station for a class of distribution of utility functions (Theorem 5). The distribution function of a contract (l, t, BU ) must be of the form X l,t,B U + , where U t is known, and is a random variable which follows a distribution with finite mean (Assumption 1). A plethora of distribution functions can be written in the above form.
In the last paragraph, we discussed a pricing mechanism which is optimal in the myopic scenario. We also show that our proposed pricing strategy maximizes the expected profit even in the non-myopic scenario when the utilities of users are the i.i.d. and the distribution follows the same distribution as described in Assumption 1 (Theorem 6).
In Section VII we characterize the conditions which will yield higher profits to the charging station in the V2G service. We show that if the conventional energy price is high, the charging station selects a preferable price for enticing V2G services if the renewable energy harvested is low. When the charging station's storage capacity is low and the renewable energy harvesting is low, the user's incentives for the V2G service also increases. The V2G service also increases the profit of the charging station.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Charging schedule for EVs using price signals for unidirectional service have been considered [5] - [7] . The above papers did not consider the optimal discharging schedule of the EVs as these papers only considered unidirectional power flow. As a result, these paper did not consider the battery degradation cost incurred in the V2G service.
Few papers considered the bidirectional power flow [8] - [13] . However, their focus was scheduling of the charging and discharging pattern of the EVs, rather than the pricing aspects. Naturally, these papers did not consider whether users will prefer the amount of battery degradation found in the optimal scheduling process. The social welfare maximizing and profit maximizing prices are also not considered.
[14] considered the optimal pricing to the EVs in a day-ahead setting for residential charging. The users control the charging and discharging pattern at each instance for the price selected by the aggregator in a pre-specified manner. However, the users can arrive randomly in the charging station, the charging station needs to select a price for each arriving user using an online algorithm. The users can not control the charging and discharging schedule at each instance in the charging station. Deadline differentiated prices have been considered [15] , [16] where the user gets a price for a fixed charging amount for different deadline. However, they did not consider the discharging amount from the vehicles. In our model, the charging station sets a price for each menu. Note that the most preferable choice for a user may not maximize the profit of the charging station, or even the social welfare. This is because the charging station may have higher renewable energy which may give an added incentive to the users to charge more. The charging station may be out of the renewable energy, in that scenario it is more beneficial that the vehicles will give energy back to the grid, or charge a lesser amount of energy. Thus, instead of fixing the preference of the user, we consider that the charging station can control the charging amount, the deadline, and the V2G service obtained from a vehicle in order to maximize the social welfare.
Note that compared to the approach where users bid their own values [17] regarding l, t, and BU , the menu-based pricing approach is a posted price mechanism. In the posted price mechanism, the user only has to select among all the possible menus. Thus, the decision is simplified. The posted-price mechanism is inherently incentive compatible, individually rational, and truthful. Further, in [17] the user's payment is determined at the end of the day, and thus users are not sure how much they have to pay beforehand. Hence, it may not be preferred by the users. In contrast, in our mechanism the users select one of the contracts and pay the prescribed price beforehand.
The closest to our work is our previous work [18] . However, in [18] , we did not consider any bi-directional flow. Thus, in the menu-based price strategy stated in [18] , there was no component of battery utilization. Hence, in the menu-based pricing approach, an additional component for the battery utilization is needed. Note that because of the battery utilization parameter BU , we need a different formulation as compared to [18] . Since now the charging station has to make sure the total amount of discharge should not exceed the BU, additional constraints are needed in the optimization problem as compared to [18] . We provide the analytical insights regarding the incentives for the V2G service. Further, this is the first work that incentivizes the users to participate in the V2G service by finding optimal prices for different amounts of battery degradation while maximizing the social welfare or profit of the charging station. Finally, compared to [18] , we have also identified the conditions under which the myopically optimal pricing strategy is optimal in the non-myopic scenario.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We, first, start with explaining the system model and the parameters. In Section II-A, we introduce the menu-based pricing policy and in Section II-B, we introduce the constraints that the charging station has to satisfy in order to fulfill a menu. A summary of the key notations is provided in Table 1 (see supplementary material).
A. Menu-Based Pricing for Arriving User
We consider that EVs arrive throughout a day at the charging station for charging. Suppose that the user k arrives at time t k . The job of the charging station is to select a price for charging in order to maximize the profit. We consider a vehicleto-grid (V2G) service where electric vehicles (EVs) can feed back stored power to the grid. Specifically, the energy can be discharged from the batteries of the EVs. However, the EV batteries have fixed number of charging-discharging cycles [19] , [20] . When the battery is used for feeding back energy to the grid, the battery wear cost may be significant. Thus, the users may want to limit the battery utilization as low as possible.
We consider that a charging station wants to maximize its profit over a certain time period (e.g. over a day). It will offer a menu-based price contract p B U k,l,t for contract (l, t, BU ) to the user k which arrives at time t k in the charging station. In the menu (l, t, BU ), the charging station specifies the amount of charge, l, l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, the user's EV will attain within time t. The maximum amount of additional battery utilization (Definition 1) is restricted to BU , BU ∈ {0, . . . , BU m ax }. Thus, in order to compensate for the discharge amount the total amount of charging the user will receive is l + x, where x ≤ BU/2 is the discharge amount (V2G service). The total amount of additional battery utilization is 2x. Hence, the user which has very limited amount of energy can still participate in the V2G service. If the user accepts the menu (l, t, BU ), the charging station can charge and discharge the battery at different times such that the battery is charged amount l by the end of the deadline. The user's participation in the V2G service also depends on the additional incentive (price reduction).
Note that even if a user's car is full of energy, it can still participate in the V2G service. The user can go to the charging station and opt for a service with l = 0. In that scenario, the charging station will pay the user for the V2G service, but will leave with the same battery as what it arrived with by the end of the deadline. Hence, if the price is high enough, the user may go to the charging station and opt for the V2G service. Our model and analysis can be easily extended to the setting where the user only comes for discharging energy i.e., l < 0. Fig. 1 depicts the menu-based pricing.
B. System Constraints
Now, we describe the constraints the charging station has to satisfy the contract (l, t dead , BU) for the user k.
Charging/Discharging rate: Let r k,t be the amount of energy provided to (or, discharged from) the EV k during time [t, t + 1). r k,t > 0 indicates that the EV k is charged and r k,t < 0 indicates that energy is discharged from the EV k during time [t, t + 1). We denote the set of existing vehicles in the charging station at time t k as K 0 . Vehicle i ∈ K 0 requires additional N i amount of energy within the deadline w i . The charging and discharging efficiency of the EV k is denoted as η k,c ≤ 1 and η k,dc ≤ 1 respectively. Note that r k,t = r
is the positive part of r k,t (it denotes that the electric vehicle k is charged during time [t, t + 1)) and r − k,t denotes the negative part of r k,t ( it denotes the amount discharged from EV k during time [t, t + 1)) (Fig. 2) . Hence, the following set of constraints must be satisfied-
r t,charge indicates the total amount of energy required for charging and r t,discharge indicates the total amount of energy used when EVs discharge during the time [t, t + 1). Note that an EV can not simultaneously charge and discharge, hence, we must have r The variable r is split into the positive and negative part to compute the charging and discharging amount in (2) and (3) and to make sure that the total discharged amount does not exceed BU .
Since the charging rate is optimized at each time slot, the charging station can use different chargers to charge a vehicle depending on the rate of the charging decided by the charging station at different time slots.
EV's battery limit: Let the battery level of the EV i at time t be EV i,t . Let the battery level at the start of the time t k be EV i,ini . Since the battery of the EV can be charged or discharged in the V2G service, the total amount of charging and discharging must satisfy the limits on the battery levels:The battery level must be between a lower value d i,min (it can be 0 2 ) and the high value d i,max (the highest capacity). Hence, we must have
Note that r
Charging and Discharging rate limit:
There is also a charging and discharging limit. Hence, we have
R m ax , and R m in are respectively the charging and discharging rate limits.
Hybrid Source: The charging station is equipped with renewable energy harvesting devices. The charging station also has a storage device with capacity B m ax . The charging station has the forecast of harvested energy asĒ t for time [t, t + 1). The charging station also can buy conventional energy from the market (Fig. 2) . Suppose that the amount of energy used from the storage device during time [t, t + 1) be e t and let the energy be stored from the electric vehicles and the conventional energy in the storage device be s t during time [t, t + 1). Let B t be the level of battery at time t. The charging efficiency and discharge efficiency of the battery of the charging station is considered to be η c,cs and η d,cs respectively. Thus,
Note that our model can also incorporate the scenario where the batteries have some static leakage rate i.e., the battery level decreases with time .
Energy to and from the grid: Let the amount the charging station buys from the conventional market and sells to the grid as q t and x t respectively for time [t, t + 1). Hence, we have e t = max{r t,charge − q t + x t − r t,discharge , 0}
Since s t is the negative of e t , thus, we can represent the above constraint in the following-
We also must have e t s t = 0 since the battery of the charging station should not charge or discharge at the same time. Though we have not explicitly considered the above constraint, however, we show that in an optimal solution in Theorem 1, we always have e t s t = 0.
Note that the constraints in (8) and (9) also specify the bound on the amount of charging and discharging from the EVs. The amount of charging can not exceed the total amount of stored energy in the battery and the energy bought from the grid. The stored energy depends on the harvested renewable energy, energy charged to the EVs and discharged from the EVs, energy bought and energy sold to the grid.
Maximum Battery Utilization: In the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) service, frequent charging and discharging may reduce the lifecycle of the battery of an EV. Thus, the users may not like the EVs be charged and discharged very often. We define a metric which will model the total maximum utilization of the battery of an EV.
Definition 1: Battery utilization is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the battery levels at two subsequent time intervals.
Hence, if the deadline is t dead for user k, then the total battery utilization for user k is
If a user selects a contract with the battery utilization level BU , the battery will be discharged at most BU/2 amount. In order to compensate the discharge amount of BU/2, the battery has to be charged another BU/2 amount. Thus, if the contract specifies that the EV will have l amount of additional charge, the total amount of charge is l + BU/2 and the total discharge amount is BU/2. Hence, the total battery utilization (sum of the charging and discharging amount) is l + BU . Since the battery has to be charged l amount, the additional battery utilization is at most BU . If the EV k is used only for charging, then
In a contract (l, t dead , BU), the battery of EV needs a charging amount of l, and thus, the total battery utilization has to be at least l.
Thus, the contract (l, t dead , BU) where BU = 0, 1, . . . , BU m ax denotes the additional battery utilization apart from the charging amount l specified by the contract. We denote BU as the maximum additional battery utilization with slight abuse of notation. Specifically, in the contract (l, t dead , BU), the maximum utilization is restricted to l + BU for user k.
Note that l is the energy that the user k will receive in the contract (l, t dead , BU). Suppose the maximum utilization remaining for an existing user i ∈ K 0 at time t k is BU i . Thus, if the user k selects the contract (l, t dead , BU), the constraint that the charging station has to satisfy is
The above constraint is not linear. In the following we reduce it in a linear form. Note from (5) that
Since r 
Note that we must have r
We show in Theorem 1 that this is indeed true in an optimal solution.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We, now, formulate the problem, the decision variables, and the objectives of the charging station. In Section III-A, we describe the optimal decision of the user after getting the price for each contract. In Section III-B, we describe the myopic scenario and the myopic optimal strategy. We consider the myopic optimal strategies because of the high computational complexity of the original problem. In Section III-C, we compute the optimal cost to fulfill a menu in a myopic scenario. In Section III-D, we specify the profit of the charging station. Finally, in Section III-E, we introduce various objectives of the charging stations which we consider in the paper.
A. Utilities of Users
User's utility for the contract (l, t, BU ) is denoted as U B U k,l,t which is a random variable. The realized value u B U k,l,t is only known to the user k, but it is unknown to the charging station. The payoff of user k or user's surplus if she selects the contract (Fig. 1) . If she rejects all her payoff is 0. The user will select the contract that fetches the maximum payoff to her.
The user's optimal decision is obtained by solving the following-
The user k's decision variable is A Note that a user only selects a menu with a non-zero positive value if it maximizes the user's surplus. In other words, a user only selects a menu which belongs to set of menus maximizing the user's utilities. If the set of maximizer is not unique, any convex combination of these solutions is also optimal since a user can select any of the maximum payoff menus.
Note that the decision of user k to accept a price menu p . . , BU m ax }. This is because the user selects the price menu among all the menus which maximizes its own surplus. For the ease of exposition, we assume that if there is a tie between accepting and not accepting a price menu, i.e., if the maximum surplus by accepting any of the price menus is 0, the user will accept the price menu. However, our result can be easily extended to scenarios where the above assumption does not hold.
B. Myopic Charging Station
We investigate the scenario where the charging station is myopic or near-sighted. Specifically, it selects a price to the incoming user without considering the future arrivals of the vehicles. In other words, it assumes that the current user as the last user. However, while finding the cost of serving the current user it has to consider the cost of all the existing users.
Note that since the users arrive at the charging station at any time throughout the day, the charging station does not know the exact arrival times for the future vehicles. The charging station is also unaware of the utilities of the users. The price selected for the current user will impact the future prices. For example, the if a lower price is selected for the current user, the user will be more likely to accept the price. This may lead to a higher cost for serving the future users. However, the future users may be willing to pay more which in turn reduces the profit of the charging station. Since the charging station is unaware of the utilities of the future users, finding an optimal price in a nonmyopic scenario is inherently challenging. Note that even if the charging station is aware of the future arrival times, and the utilities, it has to find the combinations of the users to be admitted which will maximize the profit or the social welfare. Thus, the decision space increases exponentially with the number of users. Thus, the selection of an optimal price for nonmyopic setting is computationally expensive and has been left for the future.
Note that in the finite horizon problem, the myopic pricing strategy is the optimal pricing strategy for the last user. Hence, the myopic pricing strategy is relevant on finding the optimal pricing strategy in the non-myopic pricing scenario. Note that the myopic pricing strategy is often employed for the non-myopic setting [21] , [22] . A myopic pricing strategy is optimal in the case the marginal cost of fulfilling a demand of a new user is independent of the number of existing users. We also characterize the conditions under which our proposed pricing strategies are optimal in the non-myopic scenario.
C. Optimal Cost of the Charging Station to Fulfill a Menu
Note that in order to fulfill the contract (l, t dead , BU) of user k, the charging station has to meet the demand of the existing EVs, and the demand of the new contract. Hence, the charging needs to solve the following (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (12) .
where c t is the per unit cost of buying energy from the grid and g t is the per unit cost of selling energy to the grid. Our formulation can be extended to the scenario where the cost c t is a non-linear convex function. On the other hand, if the selling price is a non-linear concave, the problem will remain a convex optimization problem, and we can employ the standard convex optimization tools to find the optimal cost. c t ≥ g t in order to avoid arbitrage opportunity. Most often there is an upper limit on the amount of energy that can be bought from the grid or sold to the grid. It is needless to say that our model can be easily extended to the above scenario. The problem will still be a linear programming problem.
The cost c t , and the price g t are assumed to be known. In case they change in a dynamic manner, i.e., they are real time prices, we consider that c t as the expected cost, and g t as the expected price, where the expectations are taken over the distribution of the real time prices.
Note that the above problem is a linear programing problem (similar to the setting considered in [18] ) and thus, it is easy to solve. However, the number of constraints are higher compared to [18] as we consider the V2G service.
In the following lemma, we show that the optimal cost to the charging station given in (14) , r The above result shows that in an optimal solution, neither the EV nor the battery of the charging station simultaneously charge and discharge. We will now compute the myopic cost of serving a menu for a user. First, we will now introduce some notations that will be used extensively in this paper.
Let Since the charging station can sell some energy taken from the EVs, the cost of fulfilling the contract (l, t, BU ) will be lower as BU will increase. The cost also decreases because of the fact that the discharged amount from an EV can be used to charge other EVs.
D. Charging Station's Profit
Suppose that user k selects the menu (l, t, BU ), the additional cost incurred by the charging station is v
If the user does not select any of the menus, then the charging station gets no. We, thus, obtain the maximum expected profit of the charging station as the following-
where Pr(R B U k,l,t ) is the probability of the event that the menu (l, t, BU ) is accepted by the user k. Pr(R B U k,l,t ) is obtained using the distribution function of the utilities of the users. Finding the profit maximizing price is inherently challenging. First, the charging station is only aware of the distribution function of the utilities. Second, the prices for different menus should be dependent on each other. If the price for a particular menu is high, the user would prefer the other menus. The optimization problem is not convex, and the objective function is not even a continuous function.
E. Objectives
The charging station decides the price for each menu in order to fulfill one of the two objectives (or, both)-i) Social Welfare Maximization and ii) its profit maximization. Note that any convex combination of the above two objectives is also an interesting research problem which we consider in the future.
1) Social Welfare: We, first, start with the definition of the social welfare. We consider the social welfare of the system consisting of users and a charging station. Social welfare of a system is the sum of the payoffs of the entities in the system. Hence, we consider the sum of the user's surplus and the profit of the charging station as the social welfare. Thus, it considers both the payoffs of the user and the charging station.
The social welfare is an important metric to know the influence of an disruptive technology on the overall system. The government should set policy which maximizes the overall social welfare. Note that electrification of the vehicles is a disruptive technology, and has potential to reduce the consumption of the conventional energy. The government may thus regulate the charging station, and the social welfare maximizing policy is of interest to them. Hence, social welfare maximization is an important metric for selecting a pricing strategy.
We, now, obtain the value of the social welfare. Suppose that the realized value of the user's utility is u Thus, the social welfare maximizing problem is
Recall that v B U l,t is obtained via solving P B U l,t (cf. (14)). The above is a constrained optimization problem.
The social welfare maximization is in general of two typesi) ex-post, and ii) ex-ante. In the ex-post social welfare maximization, the social welfare is maximized for all the realized values of the utilities. In contrary, in the ex-ante maximization, the social welfare is maximized in an expected sense. Thus, the ex-ante maximization does not guarantee that the social welfare will be maximized for every realized value of the utility of the users. The ex-post social welfare maximization is already defined in (16) .
Finding the ex-ante, let alone the ex-post social welfare maximizing pricing strategy is inherently challenging. We show that there exist pricing strategies which maximize the ex-post social welfare in the myopic scenario. We also show that the pricing strategy also maximizes the ex-ante social welfare in the non-myopic scenario when the user's utilities are drawn from an identical and independent distribution.
2) Profit Maximization: The charging station may be operated by a private entity whose sole objective is to maximize the profit. If the charging station does not make any profit, probably, there will not be many practically viable charging stations. In the absence of the charging stations, the users' incentive towards using the electric vehicles will also be small. This is because the users may not prefer a scenario where it will not find any nearby charging station if the user's vehicle has to be charged if it is necessary. Thus, in order to enhance the use of the electric vehicles, the profit of the charging station should also be maximized. The expression of the expected profit is given in (15) .
In order to obtain optimal p B U k,l,t , the charging station has to obtain v B U l,t , i.e., it has to solve the problem P B U l,t (cf. (14)) for each choice of l, t and BU . In the following, we obtain the results mainly for the myopic scenario. However, we will also identify the conditions under which the myopically optimal pricing strategy will be optimal in the non-myopic scenario. We show that our proposed myopically optimal ex-post social welfare maximizing pricing strategy is optimal in the non-myopic scenario when the utilities are drawn from the identical distribution (Theorem 2, Section IV). We also show that our proposed pricing strategy maximizes the expected profit even in the non-myopic scenario when the utilities of users follow the same distribution and the Assumption 1 (Theorem 6, Section V-C). Note that finding the optimal pricing strategy is computationally hard even for a clairvoyant charging station. Hence, our result enriches the literature for the online menu-based pricing strategy where the computationally simple pricing strategy can achieve optimality for a large class of problems which arise in practice.
V. RESULT: EX-POST SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
We first state the value of the ex-post social welfare. Subsequently, we state the pricing strategy which always maximizes the ex-post social welfare. Finally, we identify the condition under which the ex-post social welfare maximizing price is also optimal in the non-myopic scenario.
We start with finding the optimal value of the ex-post social welfare.
Lemma 3: The maximum value of social welfare is
Intuitively, the ex-post social welfare is the difference of utility and the cost function. However, if the above difference is negative, the social welfare is 0, as the user will not select any of the menus. Now, we state a pricing strategy which maximizes the ex-post social welfare.
l,t − v −k for all BU , l, and t , then it will maximize the ex-post social welfare.
The above pricing strategy is distribution independent, it holds for any arbitrary distribution. However, the above pricing mechanism does not give any non-zero profit to the charging station. The charging station only needs to solve a linear programming problem in order to obtain the cost for serving the immediate incoming user.
We provide a pricing strategy which maximizes the ex-post social welfare in a myopic scenario. Naturally, the question arises whether the above pricing strategy is optimal in the nonmyopic scenario. We obtain the following- Further, the above pricing strategy maximizes the expected social welfare in the non-myopic scenario if the utilities are drawn from the independent and identical distribution.
Note that Theorem 2 states that the pricing strategy maximizes the expected social welfare irrespective of the cost function. Hence, the pricing strategy maximizes the expected social welfare if the distribution function of the users' utilities are i.i.d. Intuitively, if the distribution of the utility is i.i.d., the position of a user is immaterial in an expected sense, hence, the expected social welfare does not change even if users with higher utilities arrive later.
However, the pricing strategy does not guarantee ex-post maximum social welfare in the non-myopic scenario. If all the demand is fulfilled either using the conventional energy or using the renewable energy, the marginal cost of serving the user k (i.e., v B U l,t − v −k ) does not depend on the existing users. Since the cost v B U l,t − v −k is smaller for higher BU , the price is smaller for higher BU .
Note that in Economics [23] , [24] , and power networks [25] , if the price is set at marginal cost, it often times maximize the social welfare. However, the marginal cost is not trivial in the menu-based price. In fact, we have to solve an optimization problem in order to find the marginal cost in a myopic scenario to serve a contract. Beyond and above, Theorem 2 shows that even when we set the price at the marginal cost to serve the contract of the next user, it maximizes the expected social welfare over all the future users. The above result is not intuitive.
VI. RESULT:PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

A. Maximum Possible Profit While Maximizing the Ex-Post Social Welfare
We now investigate the pricing strategy which maximizes the ex-post social welfare while giving a positive profit. Note that the pricing strategy given in Theorem 1 gives zero profit to the charging station. Hence, the question is how much profit can be guaranteed while maximizing the ex-post social welfare.
Before introducing the pricing strategy, we introduce a notation which we use throughout.
Definition 2: Let L B U k,l,t be the lowest end-point of the marginal distribution of the utility U B U k,l,t . Now, we are ready to specify the pricing strategy which provides the maximum possible profit while maximizing the ex-post social welfare Theorem 3: Consider the pricing strategy:
The ex-post social welfare is maximized by the above pricing strategy.
+ . This is the maximum possible achievable profit while maximizing the expost social welfare.
Note
then such a pricing strategy will provide a positive profit to the charging station. Hence, if v B U l,t − v −k is smaller than the lowest endpoint of the distribution function, then the profit will be positive. Unlike Theorem 1, the pricing strategy stated in Theorem 3 is not prior free. The charging station needs to know the lowest end-points of the support set of the distribution of the utilities. The charging station can obtain the lowest end-points of the support set by finding the highest possible price acceptable by all the users for a specific menu.
The pricing strategy stated in Theorem 3 maximizes the expost social welfare similar to Theorem 1. However, it still may not maximize the expected profit of the charging station. Thus, the expected profit maximizing pricing strategy may still not optimize the ex-post social welfare. Note that as the V2G service decreases the cost v B U l,t (when BU > 0), the price is lower to the user. Thus, even if one user (EV owner) accepts the V2G service, it can decrease the price to others.
When the charging station is clairvoyant: We now show that if the charging station would know the utilities of the users, it can select a price which maximizes the ex-post social welfare and the profit of the charging station jointly.
Before formally stating the result, we introduce a notation.
is given in Definition 3. Such a pricing strategy maximizes the profit as well as the social welfare.
The pricing strategy stated in Lemma 4 is not the only pricing strategy which jointly maximizes the ex-post social welfare and the profit of the charging station. In the pricing strategy, the user's surplus is zero as the charging station selects the price which is equal to the exact utility that a user will attain for a menu. When BU > 0 (i.e., the battery utilization is positive), the charging station's cost v B U l,t decreases. However, a user may incur a dissatisfaction cost for the discharging. Thus, it is not apriori clear whether the charging station's profit would increase. However, if the rate of decrement of cost of the charging station is higher compared to the rate of decrement of the user's utility for the battery utilization, the profit of the charging station would increase.
B. Guaranteed Positive Profit to the Charging Station
We now propose a computationally simple pricing strategy. Later, we show that if the distribution of the user's utilities satisfy Assumption 1, the pricing strategy will maximize the expected profit of the charging station.
Consider the following pricing strategy
where β > 0. Note that the pricing strategy stated in (17) is a variant of the pricing strategy stated in (18) 
+ if we allow β can also be 0. The pricing strategy in (18) entails the same profit for every menu. Since the cost v B U l,t − v −k is lower for higher BU (cf. Lemma 2), the pricing strategy stated in (18) selects a lower price for higher battery utilization. Thus, the user has to pay less if it participates in V2G service.
Higher β will deter the user's surplus. In the following, we specify the expected profit the charging station will obtain for the incoming user if it selects the price according to (18) .
Theorem 4: The expected profit of the charging station when it selects price according to (18) 
Note that as β increases the probability of the event that
Hence, higher β does not increase the profit. The formulation of the expected profit will enable us to compute the maximum possible profit when the charging station selects a price according to (18) First, we introduce a notation Definition 4:
Since the utilities are bounded, and the probability distribution from which the utilities are drawn is continuous, hence such ζ exists. By Theorem 4, ζ corresponds to β which provides the maximum possible expected profit to the charging station under the pricing strategy in (18) .
We, now, state a pricing strategy which will maximize the expected payoff for the utility functions drawn from a large class of distribution.
where ζ is as given in Definition 4. The above pricing strategy maximizes the profit for a class of utility functions which we describe below. k,l,t is a constant and known to the charging station; X k is a random variable whose exact value is unknown to the charging station.
The pricing charging station knows the utility function of the users apart from the random parameter X k . X k is an additive noise. Note that in many scenarios, the utility function consists of two components: a mean value, and a noise term which is unknown. In those scenarios, the charging station can accurately estimate the mean and the noise term is modeled as a random variable following a known distribution. Such a utility function satisfies the above assumption. We assume that X k is independent of l, BU and t, X k is only user specific.
We obtainTheorem 5: The pricing strategy stated in (19) maximizes the expected profit of the charging station (given in (15) ) when the utility functions are of the form given in Assumption 1.
Thus, if the charging station obtains the parameter ζ, it can obtain the profit maximizing pricing strategy. Note that the charging station selects a lower price for the menus with higher battery utilization.
C. Discussion
1) Non-Myopic Scenario:
Till now, we considered the pricing strategies which are optimal in the myopic scenario. We, now, consider the non-myopic scenario. Our analysis shows that Theorem 6: The pricing strategy stated in (19) maximizes the expected profit of the charging station if the utilities of the users are i.i.d. and the distribution satisfies the Assumption 1.
Thus, a simple pricing mechanism such as the fixed profit can maximize the expected payoff for a large class of utility functions even in the non-myopic scenario. Note from Assumption 1 X k is required to be drawn from i.i.d. and the distribution is independent of the users.
2) Truthfulness: Note that a strategic user may delay its arrival in order to obtain a favorable price. However, our analysis shows that the user will not gain if it delays its actual arrival time.
Theorem 7: Suppose user k achieves its highest utility a time t k (i.e., t k is the true arrival time) if the user arrives any time other than t k , the payoff does not increase.
Hence, the menu-based pricing strategy is truthful, the users will not come to charging station when the charging station is devoid of EVs.
VII. THE USER'S PARTICIPATION IN THE V2G SERVICE AND THE PROFITABILITY
The V2G service will proliferate only if the users participate in that service. However, the users will only select the menu with positive battery utilization if they get enough compensation. Thus, the charging station's profit inherently depends on whether the users have incentives to participate in the V2G services. In this section, we will analyze the conditions under which the users will be willing to participate in the V2G service, and the profit of the charging station will increase.
A. Cost of Battery Utilization
First, we discuss the cost of battery utilization. Users will strictly prefer lower utilization as lower BU will increase the battery life. A higher battery utilization may increase the battery degradation cost [19] , [20] . We denote the cost associated with the utilization BU for user k is C k (BU ) where C k (·) is a strictly increasing function.
The cost C k (·) depends on the the state of the battery 3 [19] , [20] . We assume that the user's utility
We consider that the cost function C k (BU ) for the battery utilization as a linear function i.e., C k (BU ) = α k BU . Recently, [20] shows that the per unit degradation cost for discharging remains almost constant for a wide range of values. Hence, a linear cost model can be a good approximation of the cost function. However, our analysis can be easily extended to other cost models. The charging station and even the user may not know the exact value of α k . But, the EV manufacturer can easily provide the pessimistic approximation of α k such as the worst possible battery degradation cost for per unit of energy. 4 The realized value of the utility function of user k is now u k,l,t − α k BU .
B. Profitability of the V2G service
Note that if BU ≥ 1 provides a positive payoff and a higher payoff to the user compared to BU = 0, then the user will opt for V2G service. The following result formalizes the condition.
Lemma 5: User k opts for battery degradation If the harvested renewable energy is large enough, then the charging station can fulfill the demand using the renewable energy alone. Hence, the difference between v B U l,t and v 0 l,t will not be enough for the user to participate in the V2G service. On the other hand, if the harvested renewable energy is small, then the charging station may have to buy expensive conventional energy from the grid to fulfill the demand. Hence, the user will have a higher incentive to participate in the V2G service as the difference between v B U l,t and v 0 l,t may be significant. The V2G service is more suitable when the price for the conventional energy is high. This is because when the price for the conventional energy is high, the charging station may want to use more renewable energy and the energy stored in the vehicles to serve other vehicles. Thus, the V2G service will certainly be more favorable. Thus, the user will have a higher incentive to participate in the V2G service when the renewable energy generation is small and the cost of the conventional energy is high.
If the storage capacity of the charging station is large, the charging station may buy energy from the grid during the offpeak period and use it during the peak period. This also reduces the difference between v 
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Parameters and Setup
We, now, empirically study and compare the profits, and the social welfare attained by the pricing strategies in a practical setting. We also analyze the impact of the V2G service. We investigate the scenarios under which the V2G is more profitable to the users, and the overall impact on the grid.
Similar to [26] , the user's utility for energy x is taken to be of the form
We consider that the user's utility is an increasing and concave function in the amount energy consumed x. Note that r is the satisfaction parameter. If the charging amount is above r, the utility does not change. In other words, the users are demand invariant if the charging amount is above r, and does not want to consume infinite amount. The quadratic functions such as in (21) has been considered before [27] , [28] . r is a random variable, and the exact realization is unknown to the charging station. We set r as a truncated Gaussian random variable with mean 6.9kWh and standard deviation 4.9 kWh, where the truncation is to the interval [2, 20] . The charging station is only aware of the lowest end-point of the support of the distribution function. We assume that the maximum battery capacity is d m ax = 25, and the minimum capacity as d m in = 2. The initial battery level of a new user is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the interval [2, 25] .
We set the preferred deadline (T pref ) of the user to be an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 2.5. User will not mind its EV to be charged quicker, hence, a user will strictly prefer a lower deadline for a given energy. The user's preference level increases as a convex function with the deadline. The utility of the user after the deadline is 0. Thus, the user's utility for energy l and deadline t is chosen as the following:-
The cost for the battery utilization is taken as C k (BU ) = αBU . We assume that α = 0.07. Thus, the total utility for the user for contract (l, t, BU ) is
In general, the arrival process is often assumed to be a Poisson process. We, similarly, assume that the arrival process of electric vehicles is assumed to be a non-homogeneous Poisson arrival process since the arrival rates vary over time. Specifically, the arrival rates are chosen as 16 (6, resp.) vehicles per hour during the peak period (off-peak period, resp.). The maximum charging rate R m ax is set at 3.3 kW, and the minimum charging rate R m in is set at −3.3 kW.
W assume that the energy harvesting device harvests energy which is a truncated Gaussian random variable with mean 2 kW and standard deviation 1 kW per hour. We assume that the initially the battery of the charging station is fully discharged and thus, it is set at 0. We consider the time-of-user (ToU) pricing mecahnism employed by the Duke Energy in order to set the prices of the conventional energy. We assume that the selling price, g t = c t − 0.001 in order to avoid trivial solution and arbitrage.
B. Results
We investigate the impact of the pricing strategy which we have introduced in Section VI-B. Specifically, we consider Recall from Definition 2 that L k,l,t is the lowest end-point of the utility U k,l,t . We now study the impact of the variation of β on the overall profit, and the consumption of energy. We also study the impact of the battery capacity of the charging station towards the V2G service. Towards this end, we consider two different values of B m ax ; a low value, B m ax = 5 kWh, and a high value, B m ax = 20 kWh. Fig. 3 shows that as β increases, the user's surplus decreases, as the users pay more. The decrement is not significant for small values of β. Also, note that V2G enhances the user's surplus even though the users incur costs for the V2G service. This is because the users tend to pay a lower price because of the V2G service.
1) Effect of β on User's Surplus and Profit of the charging station:
The increment of β initially increases. However, when β > 1.5, the number of EVs decreases, thus, the profit also decreases. Since the charging station's overall cost reduces because of the V2G service, thus, the V2G service significantly increases the profit of the charging station.
Our analysis shows that the social welfare is a concave function of β. When β is large, both user's surpluses and the profit of the charging station are low. When β is low, though the user's surplus is high, the profit is low. Thus, the charging station has to judiciously find the value of β.
2) Effect of Lower B m ax : Fig. 4 shows that a higher amount of battery capacity increases the profit and the user's surplus. This is because if the charging station's battery is of higher capacity, it can store more energy in the off-peak period and use it for the peak-period. Hence, the charging station's cost decreases.
Note that though a higher battery capacity increases the profit of the charging station, the charging station has to incur a higher cost in order to increase the battery capacity. Thus, the optimal capacity of the battery has to be decided based on the cost of the battery and the profit obtained. In our paper, we do not consider the cost of the battery capacity. However, our model provide the profit of the charging station for a given capacity of the battery. Hence, the charging station can decide the amount of battery capacity based on the attained profit. Further, increasing battery capacity will have diminishing returns on the profit.
3) Energy bought from the Grid: Fig. 5 shows the energy bought from the grid over the day. The figure shows that the peak is significantly reduced during the on-peak period. In fact, the peak is shifted to the off-peak period even though more users come during the on peak period. This is because during the on-peak periods, the EVs are mainly used for discharging or the charging station uses more energy from its storage. During the off-peak period, the EVs are charged, and energy is stored in the battery of the charging station. 4) Impact of B m ax on the peak energy used from Grid: Fig. 6 shows that the peak energy used from the grid is higher when B m ax is high. This is because when B m ax is high, more energy is bought and stored during the off-peak period which results in a higher peak. The reduction of the peak decreases very slowly with β initially. However, as β becomes very high, very few users are admitted which results in the drop of peak energy.
Other detailed evaluations are provided in Appendix C (see supplementary material).
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a menu-based pricing approach for V2G service where the charging station selects prices to the arriving users for different charging amounts, additional amount of battery utilization, and the deadline. The user either selects one of the contracts or rejects all based on her utility function. When the charging station is aware of the utilities, there exists a profit maximizing pricing strategy which can also maximize the social welfare, however, it provides zero user's surplus. However, when the charging station is not aware of the utilities there is no profit maximizer pricing strategy which can maximize the expost social welfare. This paper also considered a pricing strategy which gives a fixed positive profit to the charging station irrespective of the contract chosen. The conditions where the users have incentives to participate in the V2G service are characterized, and it is seen that the V2G service is more preferable when the harvested energy is low, and the storage capacity of the charging station is low.
This work can be extended in several directions. For example, the complete characterization of an optimal price in the non-myopic setting remain open. The impact of a non-myopic pricing policy on the storage decision, the V2G energy, and the consumption of the energy from the grid is also a work for the future. This paper considered a fixed price for selling the energy to the grid. The optimal price that the grid should set to enhance the V2G service or reduce the peak consumption constitutes a future research direction.
